secretsmgr configure --repo git@git.example.com:acme/secrets.git \
--root-fingerprint "<the words from [creating an organization](/setup/bootstrap)>"
secretsmgr enroll request --name alice --custody file
The request prints their fingerprint. They send you the request file, and any channel is fine because it contains no secrets, then read the fingerprint to you out loud, on a call or in person.
You run:
secretsmgr enroll approve ./alice-request.json
secretsmgr grant dev alice
secretsmgr push
The approve command makes you type the twelve words rather than click a button, and it wants all twelve. That is deliberate: this thirty seconds is what stops an attacker from having their own key added under a colleague's name, and it is the only time anyone in your organization compares a fingerprint by hand. Your signature on Alice's entry is what saves everyone else from repeating it. See the fingerprints chapter for what a mismatch means and why a partial match is the worrying kind.
Alice can now read the vault. She should also run secretsmgr doctor once, so she finds out immediately if her key custody does not satisfy some vault's policy.